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1. Introduction
This chapter discusses a metamodel suitable for ubiquitous computing environments Weiser
et al. (1999), Weiser (1993). It includes a way to pervasive computing and includes the
aspects of mobility for resources and people. The pervasive computing explores the increasing
integration of computing devices in our physical world, while mobility is studied in the
context of mobile computing, which exploits the connectivity of the devices which move
within the world of people.
However, there are still technical challenges that prevent ubiquitous computing be
consolidated in people’s lives. Currently, research has been done by focusing on technical
matters, such as the connection of devices and the building of applications for these
environments. Issues such as security and privacy are still poorly treated. In this article,
the challenges to ensuring privacy in ubiquitous computing environments are explored. A
metamodel that aims to several aspects of ubiquitous computing is extended to the aspects of
privacy. For instance, the degree of anonymity provided by an environment may be achieved.
The chapter approaches on privacy. This one is a right of every person and many nations
have laws in their constitutions that guarantee to the citizen the right to possess it. However,
privacy can not be guaranteed only by laws, especially when it comes to digital data. This
problem has been tackled in conventional computing for some time and the solution that has
been used is cryptography. This solution has been satisfactory for the current paradigm, the
personal computing. The ubiquitous computing is a new paradigm where the environments
have sensors and computing devices capable of computing and communication. The user
can communicates with such environments through their personal devices and vice versa. In
ubiquitous computing, privacy has achieved new dimensions, which were often idealized by
books and movies, but in modern times are becoming reality.
This chapter presents and discusses the dimensions of privacy in the context of ubiquitous
computing, the issues being addressed by the scientific community and provides a model
for addressing some of these issues in environments closed. This model is then simulated
through a simulator and a metric Diaz et al. (2002) is used to measure the degree of anonymity
achieved.
In the follow, section 2 presents foudations and the methods. The section 3 describes
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a metamodel for ubiquitous computing environments. The main issues surrounding the
privacy (services and restrictions) in ubiquitous environments are describes in section 4.
Section 5 presents an extension to the metamodel developed by Campiolo (2005) to describe
ubiquitous environments, with features to ensure privacy in such environments. In section
6 is presented a case-study, which was developed using the metamodel proposed and which
was simulated. Section 7 contains important conclusions of this the work.
2. Foundation and methods
In this section the base concepts and the methods used for developing the specification are
shown. It describes the entities, requirements and features of the environments and the formal
language used at the specification process as in Campiolo (2005).
2.1 Entities
Entity refers to all of the instances that somehow collaborate for the formation and
definition of a ubiquitous computing environment. In the current context, entities are
people, devices, softwares and communication medias. People engage to the environments
through the relation with other entities and behaviors. Devices with communication and/or
computing capacity are the foundation for the existence and the growing ascension of
pervasive computing. Softwares provide mechanisms for programming and to control
devices. Finally, the communication medias, in special, wireless communication, are
responsible for establishing connectivity among all entities that compose ubiquitous
computing environments.
2.2 Features
Features define properties and important requirements for composition of the environments
and must be respected by elements and in the modeling process. The most important are:
• Invisibility: it is the disappearance of user perception on the technology used;
• Intelligent environments: presence of saturated environments with electronic devices and
defined frontiers, with capacity of computing and communicating to itself and other
devices that present to them;
• Context awareness: awareness of location of the devices in pervasive world to use
information on managing and communications in the environment;
• Security and privacy: to assure security of information and of the physical devices and to
assure privacy in an environment with constant interactivity and connectivity.
3. The elements of a metamodel
In this section the model got though formal specification of the elements and features of
ubiquitous computing environments is shortly presented as in Campiolo (2005) and Campiolo
et al. (2007). Modeling aspects are presented, detailed and discussed informally, through
explaining sentences, and formally, through the model in Object-Z Spivey (1989) and Duke
et al. (1991).
3.1 Common features
In Figure 1 several properties of the physical elements that compose the scenarios of a
ubiquitous computing environment are common. By using the concept of inheritance, the
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common features were extracted and aggregated within a single class. A ModelBase class
defines common properties of four elements of the model: people, objects, entities and spaces.
An identification property exists to represent uniquely a physical object whereas the class and
description properties allow to specify object details. A position property defines the absolute
spatial location of a physical entity in the scenario. Every element that has this feature can be
located through coordinates. The emittedSignal property has the function to aggregate and
represent the set of signals that an element can transmit.
ModelBase
ClassType : {Person,Object,Entity,Space}
identification : N
class : ClassType
description : TEXT
position : N ×N ×N
...
emittedSignal : FSignal
Fig. 1. Features of the Model Base Class
3.2 People
The whole essence of the representation of a person can be modeled for who is in a
ubiquitous environment. A POSITIONAL type defines people positions in the environment
and the characteristics that relate to position, such as velocity, direction and orientation. A
PHYSICAL type represents physical characteristics, such as gender, age, size, among other.
A PSYCHOLOGICAL type type represents abstract characteristics like emotions, interests,
temper, at last, characteristics related to psychological.
3.3 Objects
Objects are all elements that do not have computing and communication, unless they are
aggregated or embedded to them.
An initialState property is a set of state variables and defines the object initial state. The
possibleState property is a set of state variables and defines all possible and valid values for
composition of any object state. The changeState property is an association function among
the events that change the object states with the transition relationship between the current
values and the new values of the state variables changed by the event. Finally, the associations
property allows the association of elements to objects.
3.4 Entities
An entity is the basis for the specifications of sensors, actuators and devices. These ones have
common features and need a structure to restrict access to determined properties. The result
is the creation of an abstract structure named Entity.
An enabled property defines if the entity is active or inactive. The connections,
communication and channel properties specify with which entities the connections, protocols
and physical communication channels are maintained.
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3.5 Communication
Connectivity in ubiquitous computing environments is essential. Connectivity is provided
by an Entity class which can be described. It defines for an entity the relation among the
physical environment, protocol and connection. The physical mean is specified through a
CommunicationChannel class, the protocol by the PROTOCOL basic type and the connection
by a pointer to an entity. Despite an Entity and CommunicationChannel classes specify
properties to represent and control communications, they are not enough to represent active
communications and to a possible simulation management. To help on these issues, must
exists a class named CommunicationController.
3.6 Events and signalings
Events and signalings in the model are represented by three classes: Signal, Event and
Command. These classes represent respectively signals, events and commands. In this case,
signals are information emitted by any element of the pervasiveworld; events are notifications
issued by entities, in special, devices; and commands are orders and parameters to change
object states. The common features of these classes are represented by Trigger base class.
Common properties like event identification and content representation are provided by this
class.
3.7 Location
Through the location information of people, objects and entities, environments manage
resources and interactions among the elements present in the spaces. For the model, location
information must support the features defined for real environments and even, provide
practical mechanisms to manage this information. Absolute location of all elements is defined
by the ModelBase class. The SymbolicLocation and RelativeLocation classes specify symbolic and
relative location, respectively. They are aggregated by the Location class. As it is complex
to maintain the location of the entities using location symbolic or relative, every element that
uses that location type it should be registered in the location controller. Tomanage the location
of all objects there is the LocationController class.
3.8 Situations
Occurrences or events generated in real world, or even in a simulation, are not all
time-dependent. Some of them have relationship with time just by running in a random
instant. Besides the existence of random events, there is a subset dependent on a collection
of states of given elements. The term used in this paper for these events is situation-based
events. Formally, they are event triggered when a finite event set is reached or activated and
originate a determined situation. The SituationController class is a structure that aggregates
the states of interest of a determined situation, associates and triggers events when states are
activated.
4. On Ubiquitous environments
In ubiquitous computing, the technology is very close to people and lives in various scenarios
that might be considered real. According to this paradigm, the computing elements should
be invisible or to induce the minimum of distraction to the user. Based on this idea, is not
acceptable that users are often interrupted with alerts and options to configure, accept or
reject any type of intrusive action. In this section, we present services that can be intrusive in
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ubiquitous computing environments, the issues to be considered and the restrictions that may
be imposed on these services.
4.1 Services
Most services in ubiquitous computing are not yet widespread or applied in real environments
Aoyama (2008). Below are described some of these services and their implications for privacy:
• Service of product identification: Through this service it is possible count and track a
product that a consumer is buying. The implications are the lack of control of the types
and use of information being collected and the possibility of an external entity track the
contents of the purchase outside the shop;
• Service of warning proximity: This service informs when a known and registered person
with your device is close to its physical location or in a common environment. The problem
is that people do not always want to be located in certain situations or times;
• Advertising service: This service sends advertisements of products to user devices when
they are close to their shops. In this case, there are some issues to be considered: (a) How
to define policies to restrict the advertising? (b) How to avoid the stressful protocols to
obtain this informations? (c) How to map the interests of a client? (d) How to define the
limits to achieve this mapping?
4.2 Restrictions
The services introduced to ubiquitous computing aims to facilitate the implementation of
tasks of the user. However, the services must comply with certain restrictions that do not
become intrusive.
A classification for these restrictions is presented below Myles et al. (2003):
• Temporal: it determines the time periods in which the service is available or disabled. For
example, a user does not like to be located in the time for lunch;
• Localization: this restricts access to informations or to the device based on the user’s
location. For example, in a restaurant the user can allow a service to obtain its name for a
personalized treatment;
• Organization: it defines who andwhen a person can be located. For example, an employee
of a company want to be found only when he is in the physical limits of the company;
• Service: this defines what services a client device can access. For example, when entering
an environment with ad services, you can restrict what is allowed to access;
• Order: it defines what informations may be disclosed for a given service. For example,
to complete a registration the client defines what data are relevant to be transmitted from
your device to the register;
• Situation: this defines the situations in which policies defined for a service may be
overlapping. This type of service requires a level of intelligence for the device. For
example, a user does not want to access any service, while he is in the room with your
boss;
• Group: it defines a common group that can access a set of user information. This restriction
applies to devices from other users. For example, a user wants to share work information
with all in their sector;
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• Interest: this determines whether services or information transmitted to the device are of
interest to the user. For instance, a user may wish to receive results of football matches,
then he can set as interest this type of information.
5. Privacy model
This section presents an extension of the metamodel for ubiquitous environments created in
Campiolo (2005) by presenting the aspects related to privacy Langheinrich (2001), Jiang &
Landay (2002), Cheng et al. (2005), Bhaskar & Ahamed (2007). These aspects are presented
and discussed informally, through explanatory sentences, and formally, through the model in
Object-Z. In addition, the mathematical notations such as those that can be used in Object-Z
are usually adopted, therefore accurately describe the properties of a computational system
Duke et al. (1991).
In closed ubiquitous computing environments1 the issue of privacy can be ensured internally
by a local system. Thus, privacy violations and the problems caused by the communication
must be protected in the environment.
Based on this assumption, in this research are considered the issues involving the environment
and the individuals within the limits of that environment. Therefore, the interaction between
devices of different individuals in the environment is not addressed.
One of the initial problems is about the user’s device communication with devices of the
environment. Additionally, all communication between devices consumes energy. Therefore
it is necessary to avoid stressful protocols and repeated attempts at communication.
The metamodel presented in Campiolo (2005) does not allow specifying the problems relating
to privacy on ubiquitous environments. The Figure 2 shows all classes built in Campiolo
(2005) and within the red rectangle are created three classes that are appropriate and based
on the concepts of (1) anonymity Pfitzmann & Köhntopp (2001), (2) the use of pseudonyms
Beresford & Stajano (2004), (3) the user’s preference profile Lederer et al. (2002) and (4) the
creation of mixing zones Beresford (2005), if necessary the existence of these in the ubiquitous
environment.
The Service class represents the services in ubiquitous environment and are detailed in
Figure 3. These services are provided by devices and sensors and, as discussed in section
4.1. They can be intrusive and annoying that may pose serious threats to privacy of such
environments.
The property identification uniquely identifies a service on the environment. The property
description can provide some information sufficient enough to describe the features of the
service. Finally, the property created has the record of the date and time of creation of the
service.
What can threaten the privacy of individuals in ubiquitous environments are abusive services,
e.g. the sending of ads and ads that are not user interest, user location monitoring, collection
of information without permission and unauthorized identification.
To prevent any service has access to personal information of people of a particular
environment ubiquitous, class PrivacyPolicy (Figure 4) for which an individual can specify
which services may have or not have access to your information.
The property identification of class PrivacyPolicy allows to specify only one privacy policy in
the model. To inform about which service is the privacy policy, can be created the property
1 Closed ubiquitous computing environments are that are physically delimited and where the
communication and computing are restricted to those limits
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Fig. 2. Main components of the specification
Service
ServiceState
identification : N
description : TEXT
created : TimeStamp
∀ x, y : identification • x = y
CreateService
∆(identification, description, created)
identification? : N
description? : TEXT
created? : TimeStamp
identification′ = identification?
description′ = description?
created′ = created?
Fig. 3. Characteristics of the class Service
service. The serviceProvider property allows us to enter a partial set of service providers. For
the execution of the service provided by these providers, the defaultMode property should
be consulted about their modes such as: allow, deny or ask. If a provider is not listed,
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PrivacyPolicy
MODE ::= allow | deny | ask
PolicyState
identification : N
service : Service
serviceProvider : P ↓Entity
defaultMode : MODE
unknownMode : MODE
temporalConstraint : seq(TIME× TIME)
Fig. 4. Characteristics of the class PrivacyPolicy
the model allows to specify which default mode of execution of the service through the
property unknownMode. If the mode is allow all unknown services have access to personal
information, if it is deny all unknown services will not have access and, finally, if "ask",
the user will have to be consulted about the new service provider and so can determine
whether or not to share your information. Finally, based on the section 4.2, it is created the
property temporalConstraint, which determines which periods of time in which the service will
be available or not.
So that the model has a more complete specification of the personal information of users and
their preferences, the class Profile, Figure 5 has been prepared.
Profile
ProfileState
identification : N
pseudonym : TEXT
personalProperties : P(TEXT × F TEXT)
servicePolicies : P PrivacyPolicy
mixingRate : N
∀ x, y : pseudonym • x = y
Fig. 5. Caracteristicas of the class Profile
In the class Profile, the property identification uniquely identifies a user’s profile. Using the
concept of mixing Beresford (2005), the property pseudonym stores the pseudonym used to
identify the user’s device and allow the mixing. The property personalProperties allows to
specify personal preferences such as, for instance, in the category of sports, for instance:
soccer, volleyball, basketball; and in the category of movies, for example: action, comedy,
romance. The property servicePolicies relates the User Profile to their privacy policies, that is,
the set of services that may or may not access the information in your personal profile. Finally,
mixingRate defines a minimal rate of individuals which must be present to occur a mixing. If
the rate is zero, this means the user does not want to participate in the mixing. Moreover, to
integrate aspects of privacy to the modeling in Campiolo (2005) has been created the property
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profile in the class Person which allows to assign the class Profile to a person; likewise the
property offeredServices in the class Entity, which allows inform which services are provided
by a particular entity.
6. The simulation of an environment
This section presents the application of the metamodel presented in section 5 for the scenery
of a shopping center. The choice for this application is due to the fact that a shopping center
is a sufficiently complex scenery, because it is composed of several other open and closed
sceneries (for instance shops, exhibition areas, salons, escalators) and these are well defined
from the physical structure shopping.
The goal is to highlight the importance and applicability of metamodel drafted, as well as
discuss the various problems leading in this scenario, in the sense to propose some viable
solutions. Only the main classes are presented in this section. In addition, in the end of the
section is presented a scenery of the shopping center modeled and analyzed in a simulation
tool.
6.1 The scenario
As previously presented in Campiolo (2005), the shopping center (Figure 6 ) corresponds to a
scenario consisting of a large amount of people with their devices and several closed and open
spaces, clearly delimited physically by the structure of shopping center. There are sensors and
distributed devices, monitoring and providing services to individuals within the limits of the
internal environment. The services are intended to conquer and provide convenience to users.
These services must not be intrusive, i.e. not transgress, the environment because it has an
infrastructure to protect the privacy of its users.
Fig. 6. Illustration of the shopping scene. Source: Campiolo (2005).
The devices and sensors can be located in the stores. They can communicate internally in the
store, that is, a client device is detected within the limits of the store, or to communicate a
certain distance outside the store. The same principle is valid for the sensors. In addition,
sensors and devices can be property of the shopping and can be distributed in other points,
being shared by several stores.
6.2 Specific problem
The following scenario illustrates a specific privacy problem in the environment studied. Alice
has a profile that is composed of two parts: a set of propositions provided by Alice (profile
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A) and a set of propositions inferred by the system or by other entities (Profile B). Alice
can determine how to the profile A can be used by the system, in whole or for a particular
purpose. On the profile B, his control is very limited, because Alice can not know of its
existence. For example, consider that Alice prepares the profile indicating that likes of action
movies, gymnastics and self-help books, as shown in Figure 7. The structure named alice is
the specification of the class Person that instantiates Alice in the environment. In this case,
the identification alice was used as the value of the property pseudonym, because Alice had
opted out of mixing (property mixingRate is zero), i.e., she does not want to maintain your
anonymity. This issue will be again discussed in the section 6.5.
Profile : profile A
identification = 14
pseudonym = alice
personalProperties = {sports, {gymnastics}},
{films, {action movies}}, {books, {self help}}
servicePolicies = marketing policy
mixingRate = 0
Fig. 7. Profile A provided by Alice
The Figure 8 presents the privacy policy of Alice, where she determines that your informations
are used by advertising service (marketing service), should not be passed to third parties,
only to the L and M libraries. In addition, through the property temporalConstraint, Alice has
defined a temporal restriction alleging that want to be addressed by these services only in
time from 8h to 18h.
PrivacyPolicy : marketing policy
identification = 16
service = marketing service
serviceProvider = sen bookstore L, sen bookstore M
defaultMode = allow
unknownMode = deny
temporalConstraint : (8h00m00s, 18h00m00s)
Fig. 8. Privacy policy for the advertising service
Now, suppose that Alice perform some purchases of books about travel in the bookstore L,
one or more times per month for a period of six months. It can be assumed that these books
are for herself, it is difficult to be present (unless Alice knows several friends who like to travel
and make birthday in this period). Thus, this bookstore is able to create a second profile for
Alice, the profile of Figure 9, which is a copy of the profile provided by her, with an additional
value in the property personalProperties, saying that she likes travel books, fact which she did
not reveal personally.
It is important to consider that this information is produced without the knowledge of Alice,
it does not fit in the constraint, it will not be provided to third parties and it is a profile more
accurate than the profile provided by herself.
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Profile : profile B
identification = 15
pseudonym = alice
personalProperties = {sports, {gymnastics}},
{films, {action movies}}, {books, {self help, traveling}}
servicePolicies = marketing policy
mixingRate = 0
Fig. 9. Profile B inferred by system
Now, suppose Alice goes shopping porting a handheld with your unambiguous identification
and your profile A stored. At the entrance, Alice is identified, the profile A is read and profile
B is rescued by the system. Passing next to the bookstore M, Alice receives a message from
some promotion of travel books. This can be approached from various points of view. Alice
did not put the information that she likes of travel books in the profile A, because personally
prefer to search when she has a specific need. Suppose she travels a lot for work, but can not
determine her destination previously. In this case, it is not useful to receive promotion notices.
Alice knows that the information placed on your profile A are used for different companies
can make customized offers. On the other hand, these offers may be interesting to Alice, they
may be more in line with their interests, and provide a good economy in some cases. In any
case, the goal of the companies is to sell, which does not necessarily satisfy completely Alice,
neither respect your wishes.
6.3 Model and architecture of the environment
The physical structure of the environment remains the same as shown in Figure 6. In this case,
are added only new sensors and devices in some areas of the environment. In the inputs and
outputs of the environment, are the sensors responsible for collecting the privacy policies of
the user. These sensors are called I/O sensors. Only the I/O sensors collect privacy policies.
Therefore, it is required an entity to store these policies. The entity responsible for storing
security policies is the central server. This server receives from the I/O sensors the information
gathered from the user’s device. The sensors and local devices access the privacy policies of a
client through a connection with the central server.
Thus, the communication protocols with the devices become less stressful and saves the
battery from the client device. The same effect is achieved with the collection of the
privacy policy file at the entrance. The collection is performed by wireless communication
(radio). The distance between the collecting device and client device is small. Therefore, the
energy expended and packet loss are much smaller. The I/O sensors must be isolated and
have a range of extension, i.e. they must not allow an external sensor retrieve or disrupt
privacy policies collection and should ensure that the client device to remain in the range
of transmission until the end of the protocol. The last architecture element added are the
mixing zones, where none of the users can be located by services. In the environment studied,
mixing zones are in the central region and in the exposure environments of the shopping
center because, in this places, there is a constant movement of people.
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6.4 Understanding the protocols
To facilitate comprehension, the implications and operation of the protocols, these are
described based on possible situations that a client is entering into an closed environment
of ubiquitous computing.
6.4.1 Entry of a client/user
A client, upon entering the environment carrying his ubiquitous computing device initiates
communication with the I/O sensors. The privacy policy file and the client identification
are transmitted. The server generates a pseudonym for client registration, which serves as a
key to recovery policies. The client device receives this unique identifier and stores it in the
corresponding field. The communication is closed.
6.4.2 Detection of a client by a sensor
Upon detecting the presence of a device, the sensors of the environment or establishment,
through a simple protocol, gets its pseudonym. After this, consult the central server to
determine the privacy policies of user’s device. If it is registered the interest of an user for
any service provided, a protocol starts to assist him.
6.4.3 Client terminates the communication with a device
A customer, when leaving an establishment or range of a sensor or device, ends links and a
mixing mark is redefined. Therefore, while trasiting through a mixing zone, this device will
receive a new pseudonym and its mark of mixing again will be redefined.
6.5 Applying the model to a problem
In this section, the problem of Alice (section 6.2) is resumed and the situations described in
the problem are applied to the proposed model. The generation of profile B, where is recorded
the interest of Alice by travel books, it is inevitable, once that to purchase, Alice is identified,
either through credit or otherwise, as the memory of seller or even facial recognition systems
used in security cameras in the store.
Given the inevitability of the generation of a profile B, the solution to maintain the privacy of
Alice is dissociate her from your profile B. This can be done by assigning a pseudonym to Alice
that will be used to identify her. Thus, when passing by the sensors of the store, Alice will not
be identified and, therefore, not linked to your profile B. Starting from the idea that Alice
wants to have anonymity, the new profile A of Alice with his new pseudonym automatically
generated by the central server is shown in Figure 10.
Profile : profile A
identification = 14
pseudonym = 4fasd452
personalProperties = {sports, {gymnastics}},
{films, {action movies}}, {books, {self help}}
servicePolicies = marketing policy
mixingRate = 1
Fig. 10. Profile A provided by Alice
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However, there are situations in which Alice should be identified, for example, to make a
payment by credit card. At this moment, the systems can locate Alice, because she is related
to the alias pseudonym. The solution is to change your pseudonym again. Forcing a user to
leave and re-enter the environment to change the pseudonym is not something plausible. To
do this, mixing zones exist, inwhichAlice can literallymix the crowd, emerging from this zone
with a new pseudonym untraceable by commercial establishments. Thus, even in cases where
Alice’s identity can be inferred by their habits (habits like visiting specific shops in a certain
order in a given time), just that Alice passes through a mixing zone to stay anonymous. In the
case of shopping center, mixing zones are central points that the user always pass, whether to
change level, or to see other stores. Thus, the chances of identification and tracking become
very low, except in circumstances where mixing rates are too low.
6.6 The OPNET network simulator
The OPNET (Optimized Network Engineering Tool) Modeler2 allows to design and study
communication networks, devices, protocols and applications. The models in OPNET are
hierarchical. At the lowest level, the behavior of an algorithm or protocol is encoded by a
finite-state diagram with embedded code based on C/C++ language. At the intermediate
level, discrete functions such as processing, transmission and reception of data packets are
executed by separate objects, which behave as defined in a process model. These objects,
called modules, are connected to form the network model that, in the hierarchy, is the highest
level model. This model, finally, is what defines the scope of a simulation.
6.7 The environment represented in OPNET
For the simulation was considered a simplified environment of the shopping center described
in section 6.1. In the simulated environment there are two bookstores, represented by the
sensors Bookstore L Sensor and Bookstore M Sensor; 3 sceneries: the first with 50 users, the
second with 100 users and third with 300 users which are represented by their mobile devices;
the central server or Server; a mixing zone represented by Mix Sensor and a I/O sensor that
is IO Sensor. This elements are presented in the OPNET network model, in the Figure 11 .
Fig. 11. Shopping center scenario in Opnet.
2 www.opnet.com
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The following describes the exchange of messages as well the element modules of the
shopping center.
6.8 Packages for exchange of messages
For the exchange of messages between the elements of the shopping center were developed
the following packages:
• shopping sensor requests pck or request package;
• shopping profile pck or profile package;
• shopping pseudonym pck or pseudonym package;
• shopping new pseudonym pck or new pseudonym package, created by mixing sensor
and useful only for users who wish to participate in the mixing;
• shopping service policies of user pck or service policies of user package;
• shopping mixing pck or mixing package;
• shopping marketing pck or marketing package.
6.9 Model of I/O sensor node
Each network node represented in OPNET consists of a node-model and a process-model. The
model of the I/O sensor node is shown in Figure 12. It is possible perceive that there are two
input flows (stream 0 and stream 1) and one output flow.
Fig. 12. Model of I/O sensor-node
The sensor-node is responsible for capturing user information and forward it to the
server, and vice-versa. The sensor-node periodically sends request packets or shopping
sensor requests pck of type Profile to the new shopping users to start exchanging messages.
If a user responds to these requests, it is by the flow 0 that the sensor will receive the packets
of type shopping profile pck from the user and will send by the output flow to the server.
The server then generates a pseudonym for this user and send it to the I/O sensor. It is by
flow 1 that the sensor will receive the packages of type shopping pseudonym pck from the
server and it sends by the output flow to the user.
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The Figure 13 presents the process-model of the I/O sensor. There are four states: start,
send, wait e end. The state start loads a structure variable called Address, with IP values
informed in the node interface. The I/O sensor node, as all other environmental sensors,
works with two BSS: 0 and 1. The BSS 1 is for communication with the user and the BSS 0 is
for communication between the sensors and the server.
Fig. 13. Process model of I/O sensor.
The state send is what sends request packets to new users of the shopping, which are packages
shopping sensor requests pck of type Profile. After send this request, the state machine
assumes the State wait. In this state the sensor waits packages from the user (flow 0) or from
the server (flow 1). This state can also return to the state send to send new requests (transition
LOOP MSG) or go to the final state end with the transition model.
The user-nodemodel is themost important, because it represents the key element of this work,
which is the user and how to maintain your privacy. As shown in Figure 14, the user’s device
has six input flows (stream 0, stream 1, stream 2, stream 3, stream 4 e stream 5) and a output
flow.
By the flows 0, 1 and 4, the user receives request packets, which are packets of type shopping
sensor requests pck of the I/O sensor, bookstore sensor and mixing sensor, respectively.
After receiving request packets from the I/O sensor, the user sends the packet with your
profile shopping profile pck to the sensor, so that the user can receive a pseudonym. As
explained in section 6.9, the sensor sends this packet to the server, which generates a
pseudonym for the user, and that is sent by the I/O sensor. The pseudonym is received
by user through the flow 2. Upon receiving the pseudonym the user’s device writes in its
internal memory the value that can be used in other communications during their stay at the
shopping.
After receive the pseudonym, the user is able to answer the requests of the bookstores sensors,
which are the requests made by flow 1. Then, the bookstore sensor will query the server to
check the permissions to send advertisements to the user and to find out the user preferences.
If it is possible to send out advertisements, the user will receive by the flow 3, and if there is
any promotion that is of interest, certainly, he will go to the bookstore.
If the user walks near anmixing zone, they receive, by flow 4, a request about yourmixing rate
for themixing zone sensor determine if the user wants or not join themixing. Yourmixing rate
value is sent in the shopping mixing pck packet. If the value of mix rate is 1, the sensor will
request the server a new pseudonym that is sent to user. This new pseudonym is received
by flow 5 in the packet shopping new pseudonym pck. This causes any parallel profile
generated by the stores is lost and only the user-generated profile is respected, maintaining so
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Fig. 14. Users node model.
your privacy.
In addition to the user-node model, there is also a process-model, shown in Figure 15 . There
are two states: start e wait. The state start loads internally the user’s IP adress and the state
wait is responsible for waiting the communications in all flows described above.
Fig. 15. User node model.
6.10 Server-node model
The server-node model is responsible for storing the user’s profile and generate a pseudonym
for this user, as soon as he enters in the shopping. The server-node model has three input
flows and a output flow.
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By flow 0, the server receives the user’s profile from the I/O sensor through the packets
shopping profile pck and it stores in your user list. After store the user, the server
generates a pseudonym, store it in the user registration and sends it to the user by the
I/O sensor in the packet shopping pseudonym pck. The flow 1 is for communications
between the sensors of bookstores with the central server. The bookstore sensor sends to
the server the pseudonym of the user, to locate your personal preferences, privacy policies
are used and checked if the sensor has permission to send an ads to the user. If it has
permission, the server sends the personal preferences and user privacy policies in the packet
shopping service policies of user pck. The flow 2 is for the server receive requests from
mixing sensor to generate new pseudonyms for the shopping clients who wish to participate
in the mixing. In this case, the incoming packet is the shopping sensor requests pck of
type New Pseudonym, and the server sends the new pseudonym to mixing sensor in packet
shopping new pseudonym pck.
As in the user-process, the server process has two states: start and wait. In start state, the
server’s IP variable is loaded and int the state wait, the server waits for packets to establish a
communication with the sensors.
6.11 Sensor-node model of bookstores
The bookstore sensor-node is interested in obtaining the user’s personal information to send
advertising services. Its sensor-node model has two input flows and one output flow.
The sensor-node periodically sends pseudonym request messages, which are the shopping
sensor requests pck packets, to the users who are nearby. The response to this request is
received in the flow 0, in the packet shopping pseudonym pck. This pseudonym is sent to
the server to the sensor obtain the preferences and service policies provided by the user. So this
informations are received by the flow 1, in the packet shopping service policies of user pck.
At receive this packet, the sensor verifies the advertisements that can interest the user and
sends in the packet shopping marketing pck.
The process-model of the bookstore sensor-node is similar to I/O sensor and has four states:
start, send, wait and end. The state start loads the sensor’s IP adress internally. The state
send sends request packet of the type shopping sensor requests pck, and wait the response
of this requests in the state wait. Finally, the end state finishes the processing.
6.12 Mixing zone
Themixing zone is represented in the environment by themixing sensor. It checkswhich users
are interested in change his pseudonym, avoiding that he is associated with any secondary
profile created by stores, as explained in section 6.5.
The mixing sensor periodically sends shopping sensor requests pck packets of type Mix to
the near users, to response with its mixing rate. The packet shopping mixing pck is received
by the input flow and processed. If the mixing rate is 1, the mixing sensor sends the user
pseudonym to the server, to create a new pseudonym. This request is made sending the
packet shopping sensor requests pck of type New Pseudonym to the server. After receive
the new pseudonym generated by the server in flow 1, the sensor in packet shopping new
pseudonym pck, sends to the user, who wants to join the mix.
6.13 Anonymity measures
Anonymity is the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, that is: the anonymity
setPfitzmann & Köhntopp (2001). For the shopping example, the definition given by
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Nussbaumer (2007) clarifies what is the set of anonymity: the group of people visiting a
mixing zone during the same period. The higher the number, the greater the degree of
anonymity offered. When the anonymity set is reduced to one element, the user is fully
exposed and loses all its anonymity. However, the user can deny the information of his
location to an application until the mixing zone offers a minimum level to anonymity. This
procedure was not implemented in the shopping scenario. According to Toth et al. (2004), the
first studies were aimed to quantify the anonymity level provided, as the size of anonymity
set Berthold et al. (2000). However, this is not a good measure of anonymity, by considering
that the probabilities might not be uniformly distributed.
With the need tomeasure the degree of anonymity, Serjantov andDanezis Serjantov&Danezis
(2002) introduced the entropy degree as a measure of anonymity. The following model was
presented by them:
Definition 1: Given an attack-model and a finite set of all users Ψ, be r ∈ R a function for an
user (R = sender, address) with respect to a message M. Let U the probability of the user u ∈
Ψ being attacked having a function r with respect to M. With this definition, the measure of
anonymity of the sender and of the receiver can be defined as:
Definition 2: The size S of a probability distribution U of the anonymity r is equal to the
entropy of the distribution. In other words:
S = - ∑Ψu=1 pu log2 pu (1)
where pu = U(u, r).
This type of entropy is known as simple entropy Toth et al. (2004). In Diaz et al. (2002) was
followed a different approach, where only the anonymity of the sender is considered. A
represents the set of anonymity of a certain message M, i.e. A = { u | (u ∈ Ψ) ∧ (pu > 0)
}. In addition, let N the anonymity set size, i.e. N = |A |.
Definition 3: The anonymity degree provided by the system is defined by:
d =
H(X)
HM
(2)
Where H(X) = S e HM = log2N. For a particular case with one user, d is assumed to be zero.
This measure is known as normalized entropy. In both cases, zero means no anonymity, ie,
the attacker knows 100% the sender of the message.
In the simple case of entropy, the maximum anonymity is achieved when S = log2N and in
normalized when d = 1 Toth et al. (2004). In this chapter will be used the normalized entropy
metric, since the major interest is in the anonymity of the sender, i.e. of the shopping user and
not the other elements.
6.14 Scenarios for simulation
To obtain the maximum degree of anonymity of the shopping were considered 3 scenarios:
one with 50 clients, one with 100 customers and, finally, a scenario with 300 customers. This
represents the number of users that may be present in the mixing zone, but not necessarily
want to join the mix. For each scenario, some situations were simulated, by varying the
number of users who wish to join the mix, as shown in Table 1.
The attack-model for these scenarios is similar to that presented by Diaz et al. (2002), for the
Onion Routing case. In this model, N is the size of the anonymity set, and the maximum
entropy for this N users is:
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Users in mix zone Users participating in the mix
1
2
50 10
25
40
50
1
2
100 20
50
80
100
1
2
300 60
150
240
300
Table 1. Situations for simulation.
HM = log2N (3)
In the case of shopping, N is the number of users that are in the mixing zone of shopping, not
even having the desire to participate in themixing zone. In this case, the attack is characterized
as a sensor of the stores trying to associate the identity of a client with a secondary profile for
this. The set that contains only users interested in participating in the mix is called set A,
where 1 ≤ A ≤ N. In this case, the probability distributions for the users A are uniform:
pi =
1
A , 1 ≤ i ≤ A; pi = 0, A + 1 ≤ i ≤ N (4)
So that, the entropy and the degree of anonymity are defined as:
H(X) = log2A, d =
H(X)
HM
=
log2A
log2N
(5)
To apply this attack-model to the presented scenarios, we are considering various sizes for the
set A, as previously shown in Table 1. The degree of anonymity obtained for each scenario is
presented in Table 2.
The results obtained with the simulations of the three scenarios were summarized and
compared in Figure 16. In all situations where there is only one client, there is no guaranteed
anonymity for the client. Even with two users, the degree of anonymity achieved is very low.
In Diaz et al. (2002) is suggested an intuitive value to the minimum degree of anonymity for a
system to provide adequate anonymity. This value is d ≥ 0,8. The situations for the samples
of sets A being approached, which gives a degree of anonymity ≥ 0,8 are the situations where
A ≥ 25, for the scenario where N = 50 users, A ≥ 25, for N = 100 users and A ≥ 150, where
there are 300 users. In addition, the maximum degree of anonymity is obtained when N = A.
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Set N Set A pi log2N log2A d
1 1,0000 5,6439 0,0000 0,0000
2 0,5000 5,6439 1,0000 0,1772
50 10 0,1000 5,6439 3,3219 0,5886
25 0,0400 5,6439 4,6439 0,8228
40 0,0250 5,6439 5,3219 0,9430
50 0,0200 5,6439 5,6439 1,0000
1 1,0000 6,6439 0,0000 0,0000
2 0,5000 6,6439 1,0000 0,1505
100 20 0,0500 6,6439 4,3219 0,6505
50 0,0200 6,6439 5,6439 0,8495
80 0,0125 6,6439 6,3219 0,9515
100 0,0100 6,6439 6,6439 1,0000
1 1,0000 8,2288 0,0000 0,0000
2 0,5000 8,2288 1,0000 0,1215
300 60 0,0167 8,2288 5,9069 0,7178
150 0,0067 8,2288 7,2288 0,8785
240 0,0042 8,2288 7,9069 0,9609
300 0,0033 8,2288 8,2288 1,0000
Table 2. Degree of anonymity obtained for the scenarios
Based on the results presented in Figure 16 , can say that the degree of anonymity of an
environment increases as the number of elements in the set A increases. That is, the more
users want to participate in the mix, harder for an attacker to discover the identity of a user.
Fig. 16. Comparison between the 3 scenarios.
A problem found in metric of calculation of the degree of anonymity is that, when considering
an environment where N = 2 and A = 2, there is d = 1. That means that we obtained the
maximum degree of anonymity for that environment, considering pi = 0, 5. However, in
practice, it is known that N = 2 does not guarantee the anonymity of these two users, even
with A = 2. For this reason, it is important always consider higher values for N and A.
An alternative could be to set a minimum value for the size of A, and the user only accept
participate of the mix when the minimum number of users for the set A is reached.
7. Conclusion
The model developed for dealing with privacy issues in closed ubiquitous computing
environments presents a solution, based on service constraints through user-defined privacy
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policies. This is satisfactory to solve the problems of privacy invasion caused by services
offered in such environments.
The model of architecture and data developed satisfies the requirements, avoiding
unnecessary packet traffic and wasting battery of client devices.
The discussion of privacy issues led to a reflection on which future concerns and precautions
that users and applications should consider for the use of devices and ubiquitous computing
environments.
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